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RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS IN THE

SOUTHERN STATES
THOMAS

R.

HAGGARDt

All eleven southern states have adoptedsomeform ofright-to-work
legislation. In this Article, ProfessorHaggardfirst examines the federal labor law background,spec/fcally the Labor Management Relations Act and the federal labor preemption doctrine. Against this
background he then analyzes the right-to-work laws of each southern
state to determine whether the laws, as construedby the courts, arepermissible exercises of statepower over laborrelationsgiven theparametersforthat regulation set by thefederallegislationandthepreemption
doctrine. He concludes byproposinga model right-to-workstatutethat
he believes willproscribe union security arrangementsto thefullest extent allowed byfederal law.

Of the twenty states that currently have right-to-work statutes, over half
of them are in the "South"-a term with cultural and ideological as well as
geographical significance. Indeed, all of the southern states have adopted this
particular form of labor legislation.' While right-to-work laws are not unique
to the South, they are a vital and unavoidable part of the southern labor environment. No discussion of labor issues in the South, therefore, would be complete without some mention of the right-to-work controversy.
The issues surrounding right-to-work laws can be divided into three
broad classes. First, there are the basic political and philosophical issues.
Which is more consistent with sound public policy, union security agreements
or the right-to-work laws that prohibit them? Are employees who receive the
benefits of union representation but do not want to pay for it truly "free riders?" What philosophical justification, if any, is there for interfering with the
liberty of employers and unions to contract for union financial support as a
condition of each worker's continued employment? These and other related
questions have received exhaustive coverage in the literature 2 and will not be
reviewed here.
t Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., University of Texas,
1964; LL.B., University of Texas, 1967.
1. ALA CODE §§ 25-7-30 to -7-36 (1975); ARK. CONST. amend. 34; ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 81202 to -205 (1960); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6; FLA. STAT. § 447.17 (Cum. Supp. 1979); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54-901 to -909 (1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-981 to -987 (1976); Miss. CONST. art. 7,

§ 198-A; Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1965); S.C. CODE
§§ 41-7-10 to -7-90 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to -212 (1955); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5154a, 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1971); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-58 to .1-69 (1976). The following states also have right-to-work statutes: Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
2. See T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 271-94
(1977); authorities cited in id. at 272 n.1; Baily & Heldman, "The fight-to- Work Imbroglio:" Another View, 53 N.D.L. REv. 163 (1976); Eissinger, Right-to- Work Imbroglio, 51 N.D.L. REV. 571
(1975).
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Second, there are the issues that revolve around the economic and industrial impact of right-to-work laws. Do right-to-work laws substantially
weaken a union's economic strength and bargaining power? What relationship, if any, is there between right-to-work laws and a state's industrial and
economic climate? Are right-to-work laws the cause or the effect of low unionization rates in the states that have them? Again, although the literature is not
as extensive as 3one might desire, these issues have received considerable attention elsewhere.
Finally there are the purely legal issues, about which the least has been
written. Even knowledgeable attorneys are usually more conversant with the
political and economic issues than with the technical legal operation of the
right-to-work laws of their own states. Ignorance of the latter, however, often
makes one's position on the former nonsensical. This is evidenced by the frequently heard assertion, "I believe in right-to-work-laws (presumably because
the speaker opposes compulsory union membership), but I also believe that
every worker should pay his fair share of the expense of collective bargaining"-which is to say that the speaker does not believe in right-to-work laws
after all! In any event, the purpose of this Article is to sketch the federal labor
law background against which the state right-to-work laws must be viewed,
and then to examine each of the southern right-to-work statutes and the cases
construing them.
I.

THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW BACKGROUND

The scope of state right-to-work laws can be understood only by initial
reference to both the federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 4 ,
specifically, sections 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), and 14(b), and the federal labor preemption doctrine.
A.

The Act's ProhibitionAgainst Discriminationand the Union Security
Exception Thereto

Section 8(a)(3) of the LMRA broadly prohibits employers from discriminating against employees "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. ' 5 Section 8(b)(2), in turn, prohibits a union from causing an
employer to engage in such discrimination. 6 Standing alone, these antidiscrimination provisions of the Act clearly make it illegal for an employer to
require either union membership or nonmembership as a condition of employment. This illegality, however, is vitiated partially by an important exception
included in section 8(a)(3), which provides:
[N]othing in this subchapter.

. .

shall preclude an employer from

making an agreement with a labor organization.

.

to require as a

3. See authorities cited in T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 285 n.2.
4. Labor Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-189 (1976).

5. Id. § 158(a)(3).
6. Id. § 158(a)(2).
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condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment .... Provided
further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for nonmembership in a labor organization ... if he has

reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. . . .7
This exception thus authorizes discrimination in favor of union membership in the form of union security agreements between employers and unions
that make "membership" a condition of employment. The wording of the exception, however, leaves unclear exactly what kinds of union security agreements are permitted. It is at least clear that the "after the thirtieth day"
language operates to exclude the "closed shop" agreement, which makes union
membership a condition of initialemployment. On the other hand, the "membership" language at first blush appears to permit the "union shop," an agreement that allows an employer to hire nonunion members but then requires
those employees to become members of the union later as a condition of continued employment. Specific reference in the congressional debates to the
"union shop" as the kind of agreement that was contemplated by the exception tends to reinforce this interpretation.8 This interpretation, however, is
inconsistent with the language in the statute making nonmembership because
of nonpayment of dues the only permissible basis for discharge. Under a true
union shop agreement, nonmembership for whatever the reason would be
grounds for discharge. Thus, it is clear that what the Act contemplates is
something less than the "union shop" in its full vigor.
In resolving the linguistic inconsistency of section 8(a)(3) and in trying to
identify the kinds of union security agreements that are allowed by the Act,
the National Labor Relations Board and the courts generally have given controlling emphasis to the "dues and fees only" language rather than the "mem-

bership" language.9 For example, in Union Starch & Refining Co. 10, a case

decided in the early years of the Act, the Board held that even though actual
membership in the respondent union required the taking of an oath and being
voted on at a union meeting, an employee's refusal to take these steps to obtain membership could not be grounds for discharge under a union security
agreement as long as the employee tendered the appropriate dues and fees.
The Union Starch doctrine has been adopted by various courts of appeal and
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court, which further noted that
"'membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial
core.)

1

7. Id.§ 158(a)(3).
8.
9.
10.
(1951).
11.

For a detailed analysis of the legislative history, see T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 60-69.
For a more detailed analysis of the relevant case authority, see id.at 39-59.
87 N.L.R.B. Dec. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,342 U.S. 815
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
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Moreover, if "membership" of the kind contemplated by a true union
shop were in fact authorized by the statute, the employee-member, by virtue of
the contractual relationship between the union and its members, would be
subject to the internal rules and discipline of the union. Because unions would
have the power to impose legally enforceable fines for, among other things,
refusing to honor picket lines, 12 unions have been especially desirous of having the union security provisions of the Act construed in this fashion.' 3 Although the issue has never been squarely resolved, the Board and court
decisions dealing generally with the power of unions to discipline members
suggest that unless limited by the terms of the membership agreement itself, an
employee is free to resign his membership and thus avoid the union's disciplinary power. This is true "irrespective of the wording of the contractual unionsecurity provisions."' 4 Because no union disciplinary power flows from the
security agreement itself, and because an employee can be required to do no
more than tender the equivalent of membership dues and fees, it follows that
the kind of union security agreement that the Act authorizes is nothing more
than the "agency shop"--an agreement whereby employees merely are required to pay their pro rata share of the cost of union representation but are
not formal members and thus are not subject to the internal disciplinary powers of the union.
The Board, courts, and scholars were slow, however, in attaching that
characterization to section 8(a)(3) union security agreements, 15 and the legal
theory underlying the characterization has been contested vigorously by unions.' 6 The Supreme Court, however, has recently said, albeit in dicta, that
the "union shop" contemplated by section 8(a)(3) is "the 'practical equivalent'
of an agency shop. . . ," 17 and although some of the earlier labor law texts
concede that the "union shop" authorized by the statute was a "substantially
limited" one,' 8 more recent texts expressly characterize the scope of those limitations by reference to what is allowed under an agency shop arrangement. 19
In sum, section 8(a)(3) of the Act permits only the agency shop form of
12. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1967).
13. This was clearly the motive of the union in NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
14. Sales, Serv. & Allied Workers' Local 80, 235 N.L.R.B. Dec. 1264, 1265, 98 L.R.R.M.
1123, 1124 (1978).
15. But see Haggard, .4Clarification ofthe Types of Union Security Agreements Affirm ately
Permittedby FederalStatutes, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 418 (1974).
16. Recent cases in which the unions have unsuccessfully challenged the agency shop interpretation of the Act include NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975); Buckv. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
ley
1093 (1974); Boilermakers Local 749 v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 926 (1973). But f. Local 1104, Communications Workers v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976) (employees who are denied formal membership in the
union are excused from paying dues and fees under union security agreement, a conclusion probably inconsistent with a "pure" agency shop theory).
17. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977).
18. E.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 701 (C. Morris ed. 1971).

19. E.g., D.

LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL

339 (1979) (statute "nullifies union security

clauses more stringent than the agency shop clause."); R. GORMAN,BASic TEXT ON LABOR LAW

644 (1976) (statutory union security clause "in substance can exact no greater fealty to the union
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union security agreement. Thus, any contractual arrangement between unions
and employers that requires more of employees than this is illegal under fed-

eral law. The significance of right-to-work laws becomes apparent only if that
is borne in mind. 20
B.

CongressionalConfirmation of State Authority to Pass Right-to- Work
Laws-Section 14(b)

Although Congress stopped short in section 8(a)(3) of making all varieties
of compulsory unionism illegal as a matter of federal law, it recognized in
section 14(b) the power of the various states to do this as a matter of local law.
The section reads:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor

organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory
execution or application is prohibited by State or Terin which such
21
ritorial law.
From a contemporary perspective, section 14(b) appears to be an anomalous exception to an otherwise pervasive federal preemption doctrine, a doctrine that nullifies most state laws purporting to regulate the labormanagement relationship. It would likewise appear that "but for" section
14(b), state right-to-work laws would be void. All of this has led some courts

to construe strictly and narrowly the scope of section

14(b).

22

Such an ap-

23
proach, however, is inconsistent with the legislative history of this section.
The original Wagner Act,24 through a broadly worded exception to the

section 8(a)(3) prohibition against discrimination on the basis of union membership, in essence permitted all forms of compulsory unionism, including the
closed shop. In addition, the original Wagner Act contained no express au-

thorization of state prohibitions against compulsory unionism. Nevertheless,
it was clearly the intention of Congress, 25 as the Supreme Court later recogthan does the agency shop provision, which requires the payment of union dues and initiation fees
but not full membership).
20. Because federal law already prohibits everything more stringent, "the only effect of state
'right to work' legislation. . . is to permit states so legislating to prohibit even the initiation fees
and dues obligations of agency shops, and to permit employees who do not voluntarily pay dues
and initiation fees to be free-riders." D. LESLIE, supra note 19, at 340. It is for this reason that it is
nonsensical to assert simultaneously one's support for right-to-work laws and one's opposition to
"free riders."
21. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
22. See, e.g., Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965). In some
instances, however, a narrow reading may be justified. For example, many state right-to-work
laws prohibit not only employment discrimination against nonmembers but also discrimination
against members. An employment requirement of nonmembership clearly does not constitute a
form of "compulsory unionism" encompassed by the scope of § 14(b), and the sections of state
right.to-work laws having this effect have been held to be preempted by the prohibitions of
§ 8(a)(3). Bukovac v. Daniel Constr. Co., 469 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Va. 1978); Johnson v. Elec.
Sales Co., 363 So.2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
23. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 145-48.
24. Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1976)).
25. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st
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nized, 2 6 not to interfere with the then existing powers of the state courts to
declare illegal the closed shop or any other lesser form of compulsory unionism. This result was thought to flow from the wording of section 8(a)(3)
which, like the current wording of the section, did not affirmatively authorize
union security agreements but merely declared them "not illegal" as a matter
of federal law, thus leaving it entirely up to the states to regulate the matter as
they saw fit.
Because questions about federal preemption were beginning to be raised
with increased frequency, the Taft-Hartley Congress in 1947 felt constrained
to make express what the Wagner Act Congress had left implicit. The House
Conference Report put it in these terms:
It was never the intention of the National Labor Relations Act [the
Wagner Act], as is disclosed by the legislative history of that act, to
preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their
powers to prevent compulsory unionism. Neither the so-called
"closed shop" proviso in section 8(a)(3) of the existing act nor the
union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in section
8(a)(3) of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of this sort in states where such arrangements were contrary to the state policy. To make certain that there should be no
question about this, section 13 was included in the House bill. The
conference agreement, in section 14(b), contains a provision having
the same effect. 27
In sum, it appears that in 1947 Congress intended for the states to have
broad authority to prohibit or regulate what was seen as the evil of "compulsory unionism," a term arguably broad enough to encompass any kind of legally required support, financial or otherwise, of labor unions.
The case law, however, does not always reflect that intention. State rightto-work laws operate against the closed shop, 28 union shop, agency shop, 29
and maintenance-of-membership 30 agreements, but generally go no further.
In two important respects, a narrow reading of the scope of section 14(b) has
rendered inoperative state prohibitions against what the legislative history
may have intended when it referred to "other form[s] of compulsory unionism."31
Sess. 17 (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 7570, 7673 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner); Id. at 9726 (remarks of Rep. Connery).
26. See Algoma Plywood Co.v.Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1948).
27. I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at
564. "Thus, even in the absence of § 14(b), the union shop and agency shop would not be unfair
labor practices, and would not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board." Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 457 F. Supp. 1207, 1216 n.7 (D.N.D. 1978).
28. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961). Conra,
Walles v. IBEW Local 405, 252 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1977).
29. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
30. Algona Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301
(1948).
31. I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at
564.
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The first of these involves irrevocable check-off authorizations. A checkoff authorization, whereby the employer withholds the dues from the employee's paycheck and forwards it to the union, is a means commonly used by
employees to pay the dues owed to the union that represents them, whether
such employees are voluntary members or mere agency-fee payers under a
union security agreement. Thus, the check-off is an integral part of the entire
compulsory unionism issue.
In general the law takes a rather jaundiced view of check-off arrangements. An agreement between an employer and a union imposing a
mandatory check-off on employees does not fall under the protection of the
section 8(a)(3) proviso and thus is a form of discrimination prohibited by the
Act.3 2 In addition, section 302 of the Act 33 prohibits mandatory check-off authorizations and even limits to one year the irrevocability period of those that
are voluntary.34 Nevertheless, the question has arisen whether states, under

the aegis of section 14(b), have the power to require that check-off authorizations be revocable at will.
The Supreme Court has answered this question in the negative, but without consideration of the full implications of its holding. In SeaPak v. Industrial Employees 35 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia held that the portion of the Georgia right-to-work law making check36
off authorizations revocable at will was preempted by section 302 of the Act.
by both the Fifth Circuit Court of ApThis decision was affirmed per curiam
38
peals 37 and the Supreme Court.
Relying on the general preemption doctrine that incompatible doctrines
of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law, the district court
39
concluded that the Georgia law and section 302 were "completely at odds."
Moreover, even apart from the question of direct conflict, the court found that
the "area of checkoff of union dues has been federally occupied to such an
extent ...that no room remains for state regulation in the same field."' 4 The
Georgia statute, therefore, could be considered valid only if it fell within the
scope of section 14(b). The court held, however, that section 14(b) "contemplates state regulation only as to forms of union security which are 'the practi32. See, eg., NLRB v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 498 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974); John B.
Shriver Co., 103 N.L.R.B. Dec. 23 (1953).

33. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
34. Id. § 186(c).
35. 300 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aft'd, 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam,
400 U.S. 985 (1971); see also, NLRB v. Shen-Mar Food Prods., Inc., 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 593 v. Shen-Mar Food Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1122 (W.D.
Va. 1975); United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ala. 1972),
modfed, 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); International Bhd. of Operative Potters v. Tell City Chair Co., 295 F. Supp. 961 (S.D. Ind. 1968); State v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 120 Utah 294, 233 P.2d 685, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
36. 300 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
37. 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970).

38. 400 U.S. 985 (1971).
39. 300 F. Supp. at 1200.
40. Id.
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cal equivalent of compulsory unionism' ", a characterization which could not
apply to "[c]heckoff authorizations irrevocable for one year .... ,,4,
The court's decision is open to question on a number of points. First,
section 302 merely says that certain check-off authorizations, those that are
voluntary and irrevocable for no more than one year, are not under its provision.42 In contrast to the situation in which a statute affirmatively makes
something a matter of right, a statute that merely expresses a disinclination to
make something a wrong is not "incompatible" with a statute that does in fact
make it a wrong, at least in the absence of some concrete evidence that the
legislature intended for such a negative inference to be drawn. That evidence
is lacking in the check-off situation. Contrary to the holding of the SeaPak
court, it is not clear that Congress intended section 302 to be a comprehensive
regulation of union check-off practices. Rather, the check-off was peripheral
to the central concern of section 302-the prohibition of bribery, kickbacks,
and extortion. 43 Even with respect to that objective, it is not clear that state
law is totally preempted. 44
Finally, and most important, the court simply ignored the realities whdn it
asserted that an irrevocable check-off is not a form of "compulsory unionism"
contemplated by section 14(b). It may be argued that, although it is irrevocable for one year, the check-off is not "compulsory" because it must be voluntarily agreed to in the first instance.45 The same is true, however, of a
maintenance-of-membership agreement, under which an employee who is a
voluntary member of the union at the beginning of the contract is required to
remain a member for the duration of the contract. ("Membership" here, of
course, pertains only to the payment of periodic due and fees.) Maintenanceof-membership agreements are clearly prohibitable under section 14(b). Yet,
although exactly the same result can be accomplished for at least a year under
an irrevocable check-off authorization, this latter kind of arrangement, under
the SeaPak decision, is not subject to prohibition under state right-to-work
laws. This is an anomaly that the SeaPak decision leaves unexplained, and it
indeed suggests that the decision is wrong.
The mandatory hiring hall 46 is the other area in which a narrow reading
of section 14(b) has resulted in a form of compulsory unionism that is capable
of surviving even in right-to-work states. Historically, the hiring hall was simply an adjunct of the closed shop; employee use of the hiring hall was
41. Id. at 1201.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
43. See Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); see also
T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 156-57.
44. See People v. Knapp, 157 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Ct. [Gen.] Sess. 1956), a7'dsub nor. Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
45. Cf. NLRB v. Atlantic Printing Specialties, 523 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1975) (check-off
arrangements "intended to be an area of voluntary choice for the employee").
46. The hiring hall is essentially a union-operated job-referral service that provides qualified
employees in response to requests for workers from employers. See generally, R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 664 (1976).
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mandatory, and only existing union members were referred. 47 It is undoubtedly true that when Congress outlawed the closed shop, it intended to outlaw
the discriminatory hiring hall as well, because the hiring hall that discriminates in referrals on the basis of union membership is the functional
equivalent of the closed shop.4 8 It is an open question, however, whether
under section 14(b) the states have concurrent authority to prohibit this particular form of compulsory unionism. It would seem that they should, 49 and the
case law arguably supports that proposition. With regard to exclusive but nondiscriminatory hiring halls the courts have read section 14(b) narrowly and
consistently held that arrangements of this kind are beyond the purview of
state right-to-work laws. 50 As one court put it, a "hiring hall which, though
exclusive, does not require union membership does not violate the closed shop
prohibition of § 8(a)(3)

.

.

and thus, afortiori,it is not within the ambit of

§ 14(b)."'' s Logically, the converse of that should also be true, namely, that
exclusive and discriminatory hiring halls violate the statute and thus fall
within the ambit of section 14(b). In fact, one federal district court recently
noted:
Plaintiff contends that Article V of the Stabilization Agreement violates [the North Dakota Right to Work Law] because it discriminates
against employees on account of their status as members or nonmembers of a labor union. If there is such discrimination,it is clear that
North Dakota's right-to-workstatute is violated, and that Article V is

within § 14(b), for it would then require union membership as a conemployment; only union members would be referred by the
dition 5of
2
union.

The court further indicated, however, that in order to fall within the ambit of
law the discrimination had to be apparent on the face
the state right-to-work
53
of the agreement.
Discriminatory referrals, however, are not the only practice that should
bring hiring halls within the coverage of state right-to-work laws. Section
14(b), rather, authorizes the states to prohibit far more than merely the closed
shop. It extends to other, "less stringent union-security arrangements" 54 as
well, especially those making payments to the union a condition of employ47. See Fenton, HiringHalls Under the Taft-HartleyAct, 9 LAB. L.J. 505 (1958).
48. Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
49. See generally Wilhoit & Gibson, Can a State Right-to- Work Law Prohibitthe Union-OperatedHiringHall? 26 LAB. L.J. 301 (1975).
50. See, e.g., Laborers Local 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1973); NLRB v.
Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Tom Joyce
Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965); Stricker v. Swift Bros. Constr. Co., 260 N.W.2d 500

(S.D. 1977).
51. Laborers Local 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1973).
52. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 457 F. Supp. 1207, 1218 (D.N.D.
1978) (emphasis added). But cf Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Elec. Corp., 400 Mich. 192, 253 N.W.2d
633 (1977) (discriminatory referral as a common-law conspiracy preempted by federal duty of fair

representation).
53. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 457 F. Supp. 1207, 1219 (D.N.D.

1978).
54. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 752 (1963).
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ment, which is what the statutory term "membership" actually means. Although the law is far from clear on the subject, it appears that a union can
normally charge a hiring hall fee that reflects the "costs of the referral system
and of collective bargaining and contract enforcement."5 5 This is roughly the
same amount as can be charged under an agency fee arrangement, which
states can clearly prohibit. If unions can charge an equivalent amount under
the guise of a hiring hall "use fee", however, and if nondiscriminatory hiring
hall arrangements are generally not subject to regulation under state right-towork laws, then unions in industries in which hiring halls are prevalent have
an easy way to circumvent the clear intent of Congress. None of the cases
contesting the legality of hiring halls under state right-to-work laws have
raised, expressly, this "use fee" issue.5 6 It would be easy for a court, however,
following the SeaPak approach, simply to conclude that hiring halls are already extensively regulated by the federal act, are not literally a form of "compulsory unionism", and that the fee aspects of their use are thus beyond the
scope of state right-to-work laws. Such an approach, however, again would
ignore the realities of the situation.
Other decisions, although not dealing with the kinds of union security
agreements the states are allowed to enact, also tend to reflect a rather limited
view of the scope of section 14(b). For example, in Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn (Schermerhorn II),57 the Supreme Court held that while the
states have the power to enforce their own right-to-work laws, this power
"begins only with actualnegotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)."'58 Thus, under the "agreement" test of SchermerhornII,
the states do not have authority to curtail the use of union economic power
through such vehicles as strikes or picketing that are directed merely toward
the achievement of this illegal objective.
In another ruling taking a restrictive view of section 14(b), the Supreme
Court has held that state right-to-work laws cannot apply to employees hired
within the state if they perform most of their work outside the state. 59
"Outside the state" has been held to include all federal enclaves, even those
located within the physical boundaries of a state. 60
55. Boston Cement Masons Union 534, 216 N.L.R.B. Dec. 568 (1975).
56. In an analogous context, however, the Board has held that a union could not charge

nonmembers a "grievance processing fee," because this would amount to a form of compulsory
unionism illegal under the Texas right-to-work law. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. Dec. 318,
328-29 (1953).
57. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
58. Id at 105 (emphasis in original).
59. Oil Workers Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976), notedin 55 N.C.L. REV. 685

(1977).
60. King v. Gemini Food Servs., Inc., 562 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1065 (1978) (per curiam); Vincent v. General Dynamics Corp., 427 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Cooper v. Gereral Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 533 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,433 U.S. 908 (1977). But see Lord v. Local 2088, I.B.E.W., 481 F.
Supp. 419 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (right-to-work laws applicable to federal enclaves ceded after the
passage of such laws).
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Finally, in Beasley v. FoodFairof North Carolina,6 1 the Supreme Court
held that a supervisor who was discharged for joining a labor union could not
sue under the state right-to-work law which, in addition to prohibiting compulsory union membership, also prohibited compulsory nonmembership. The
Court held that the employer's actions were affirmatively protected by section
14(a), which provides that "no employer. . . shall be compelled to deem indiof any law,
viduals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose
62
either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
The Beasley case could be read as also excluding supervisors from the
protections of right-to-work laws in the normal context-when the supervisor
is being discharged, usually due to union pressure on the employer, because of
the supervisor's refusal to join or pay dues to a union. This, however, would
be an anomalous result and arguably inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting section 14(a). Congress believed that the balance of power in
the collective bargaining process was upset when the agents of managementthe supervisory personnel-also owed a duty of loyalty to the union.63 Section
14(a) thus was written to permit employers to prohibit such membership
among its supervisors, and any state laws to the contrary were to give way.
This purpose, however, clearly would not be served by similarly preempting
laws that void agreements affirmatively requiring supervisors to join the
union. To the contrary, such laws reinforce the policy of section 14(a) by further insulating the employer from union pressures aimed at subverting the
loyalty of the supervisory personnel. The Court in Beasley, moreover, implicitly recognized that despite the wording of section 14(a) the anomalous result
was possible."4 How that case would be resolved, however, remains unclear.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS

Section 8(a)(3) of the Act already outlaws most forms of compulsory
unionism, and section 14(b) tells the states that they can do that and more.
Although the ultimate parameters of these two sections may be somewhat obscure, and in some cases incorrectly perceived by the courts, it is against this
background that the same right-to-work laws must be evaluated. The purpose
of this section is to see how the state courts have construed their own statutes,
given the limitations of federal law as set out above.
A. Alabama
Alabama adopted a "conventional" right-to-work statute in 1953.65 Previously, however, the state already had on its books a statute that prohibited a
61. 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)(1976).
63. See I NLRB, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 409.
64. 416 U.S. at 657.
65. 1953 Ala. Acts No. 430, at 535 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 25-7-30 to -7-36 (1975)).
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form of compulsory unionism of the truly literal variety. 6 6 That statute prohibits the use of "force, coercion, or intimidation," or threats thereof, to interfere with the freedom "to join or refrain from joining any labor
organization." 67 The Alabama Supreme Court has read the statute to mean
68
exactly what it says, and thus has held that neither a closed shop agreement
nor a maintenance of membership agreement, standing alone, 69 falls within
the statute's prohibition because no force is used to obtain such agreements.
On the other hand, in Klibanoff v. Tri-CitiesRetail Clerks' Union,70 the
court gave the term "coercion" a more expansive reading. In Kilbanoff a
union picketed to induce the employer to recognize it as the exclusive bargaining agent "with authority to so contract as to require all employees to belong
to the union when a majority of them have not so consented."' t The court
conceded that the picketing was not coercive per se and recognized, consistent
with the above authority, that the statute itself did not outlaw the normal
closed shop arrangement. 72 The court said, however, that a closed shop agreement was permissible only when the union, at the time of contracting, was the
freely selected representative of a majority of the employees. 73 On the other
hand, a closed shop agreement between an employer and a minority of the
employees was impermissible. Therefore the picketing to obtain such an impermissible objective was "coercive" in the legal sense and thus subject to in74
junction under the statute.
The court's reasoning on this point, however, is unclear. It conceded that
there was no state statute denying bargaining status to anyone but a union
supported by a majority of the employees, but noted that the right to join or
not join a union free from coercion was guaranteed by the statute. The court
thus concluded that the employees would not be free from coercion if by
"picketing they may be forced into accepting a contract made by a bargaining
agent not the choice of a majority of them, which contract would require all
employees to become members. '75 That, however, begs the question of what
the term "coercion" in the statute actually means. Moreover, from the perspective of the individual employee who does not want to join the union, it is
immaterial whether the compulsion to do so comes from a majority of his
66. ALA. CODE § 25-7-6 (1975).
67. Id
68. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So.2d 696 (1947), cerl.
denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
69. Walter v. State, 34 Ala. App. 268, 38 So.2d 609 (1949).

70. 258 Ala. 479, 64 So.2d 393 (1953) (per curiam).
71. Id at 485, 64 So.2d at 397.
72. Id
73. Id at 486, 64 So.2d at 399.
74. Id The plaintiff in this case was alleged to be a purely intrastate business and this point
was not contested by the union. If the case came up today and the business (as was probably true
then as well) was found to be in interstate commerce, then an injunction would likely be improper
under Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). Accord, Radio Broadcast
Technicians Local 1264 v. Jemcon Broadcasting Co., 281 Ala. 515, 205 So.2d 595 (1967) (no state
jurisdiction to enjoin picketing to obtain a union shop).
75. 258 Ala. at 485, 64 So. 2d at 398.
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fellow employees or from only a minority of them. The employee's individual
choice, which is what the statute was designed to protect, is no less constrained
in one situation than in the other. Nevertheless, in this case the court made the
union's minority status the controlling element in the finding of coercion.
The other, more conventional, Alabama right-to-work statute is relatively
comprehensive in its scope. After declaring the public policy of the state to be
"that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account

of ... nonmembership in any labor union ...."76 the statute goes on to
prohibit "any agreement or combination between any employer and any labor
union. . . whereby [union] membership is made a condition of employment
or continuation of employment by such employer, or whereby any such union
-77 To the
...acquires an employment monopoly in any enterprise ....
extent that the statute prohibits literal union security agreements-provisions
of a collective bargaining contract-it is clearly within the ambit of section
14(b). In fact, a "combination" short of a provable "agreement" but having
the proscribed effect would also be within the authority of the states to prohibit. If nothing else, a court could indulge in the fiction that there was an
implied agreement.
In another section, however, the statute prohibits employers from requiring union membership as a condition of employment, whether or not acting in
concert with a union.78 This raises a debatable section 14(b) issue. A narrow
reading of section 14(b) suggests that the locus of legitimate state concern goes
no further than neutralizing, in this particular area, the power that unions
have been given by federal law, thus making union involvement a sine qua non
of state authority to regulate. On the other hand, a broader reading of section
14(b) would identify as the legitimate state interest the broader policy that
union membership should be disassociated from one's status as an employee, a
policy that is violated when an employee is discharged for nonmembership,
regardless of whether the union is involved. That is clearly the underlying
theory of the federal prohibitions on union security,79 and to the extent that
section 14(b) merely says the states can go even further, the same policy should
carry forward.8 0
On its face, the Alabama statute appears to prohibit the exclusive hiring
hall as well as hiring hall "use fees." The language prohibiting the creation of
a union "employment monopoly" seems to cover an arrangement in which the
union becomes the sole source of employees, and another section expressly
prohibits an employer from requiring, as a condition of employment, that an
employee "pay any dues, fees or other charges or any kind to any labor union
76. ALA. CODE § 25-7-30 (1975).
77. Id § 25-7-31.
78. Id § 25-7-32.
79. See T. HAOGAPD, supra note 2, at 65-67.
80. In a similar vein, the Alabama right-to-work statute prohibits an employer from requiring an employee "to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union ... ." ALA.CODE
§ 25-7-33 (1975), a provision obviously preempted by federal law. See, eg., Bukovac v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 469 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Va. 1979).
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The exclusive aspects of a hiring hall arrangement, however, are
scope of state regulation, and jurisdiction over "use fees" is
clearly beyond the
82
arguable at best.
The Alabama statute expressly provides that a person who is denied employment in violation of the statute can recover damages from the employer
and any person acting in concert with him.8 3 Finally, the statute contains a
"grandfather clause" that exempts any agreements entered into prior to the
84
effective date of the act.
As is true in most states, the Alabama right-to-work law has not been the
subject of extensive litigation. A few cases, however, deserve mention. In
Moving PictureMachine OperatorsLocal 236 v. Cayson,8 5 the collective bargaining agreement provided that seniority would be used to determine job
rights. Seniority, however, was based on length of union membership rather
than length of employment. An employee who was "bumped" from a job by a
more senior person sued the employer, alleging a violation of the right-towork statute. The Alabama Supreme Court held that this arrangement indirectly made union membership a condition of employment. The court concluded: "We are of the opinion that a contract, which makes longevity of
union membership ... a condition [of continuation of employment,] makes
union membership itself a condition of continuation of employment. In order
to have longevity of union membership, the employee must first have union
membership."' 86 Because the arrangement apparently made seniority turn on
formal union membership, it was undoubtedly in violation of federal law as
....

well.

"81

87

Although the case itself is relatively simple, Head v. Local 83, Journeymen
Barbers88 raises some interesting questions concerning the potential scope of
right-to-work laws. The defendant, a barber, had obtained a "union shop"
card from the union and had expressly agreed that the card would remain the
property of the union and would not be displayed unless all persons working
in the shop were union members in good standing. The defendant himself was
not such a member but nevertheless displayed the card in the barbershop window. The union sought to enjoin the retention and display of the card, and the
barber defended on the grounds that the agreement was illegal under the Alabama right-to-work law. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the right-towork law did not apply because the agreement was protected by the statute's
"grandfather clause," and further added, "[h]owever, we would not be under81. ALA. CODE § 25-7-34 (1975) (emphasis added).
82. See text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
83. ALA. CODE § 25-7-35 (1975).
84. Id § 25-7-36.
85. 281 Ala. 468, 205 So.2d 222 (1967).
86. Id at 479, 205 So.2d at 231.
87. Cf. Local 138, Operating Eng's. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1963) (referral system
based on seniority and distinguishing between members and nonmembers a "bad" practice, and
violation of Act) (dictum).
88. 262 Ala. 84, 77 So.2d 363 (1955). See also, Foutts v. Journeymen Barbers, Local 105, 155
Ohio St. 573, 99 N.E.2d 782 (1951).
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stood as holding
that it would apply to the instant case even in the absence of
'89
[that clause]."

Because the card was the property of the union, the display of it by the
barber was fraudulent, and the union was merely seeking its return rather than
the discharge of a nonunion employee, the court's conclusion is understandable. If the facts change slightly, however, a different result might follow. First,
that this was not a collective bargaining agreement should not automatically
take it outside the ambit of the right-to-work law. The Alabama statute talks
in terms of "any agreement," 90 and section 14(b) contains no express or implied limitations in that regard. Thus, if the barber/employer in this case had
discharged a barber/employee because of the union's- insistence on the barber/employer's compliance with the terms of the agreement regulating the
card's use, a violation of the statute would be obvious. A more difficult question, however, would be presented if, when the employer hired a nonunion
barber, the union merely demanded the return of the card for noncompliance
with the agreed condition. In this situation the employer might argue that
because the portion of the agreement concerning the use of the card contravenes the state right-to-work law it should be excised from the rest of the
agreement and denied enforcement. Out of the "union shop" card context,
this argument would be persuasive. For example, if a union loaned union
monies to an employer on the condition that no nonmembers be hired, with
the debt to become due immediately if the condition is not satisfied, a voiding
of only the acceleration provision of the loan agreement would be appropriate.
Thus, the employer would be allowed to pay off the loan in the normal course
despite noncompliance with the condition. Voiding the members-only condition of the "union shop" card agreement, however, while not allowing the
union to demand the return of the card when nonunion employees are hired is
nonsensical. Indeed, the display of the card under such circumstances is
fraudulent misrepresentation. 9 1 On the other hand, permitting the union to
demand the return of the card would serve as a strong inducement to sympathetic barber/employers to insure that the membership condition is satisfied.
The most sensible way out of this dilemma would be to prohibit altogether the use of the "union shop" cards in right-to-work states. The agreement underlying the use of the card, whether it be express or implied, is a clear
violation of a right-to-work statute such as Alabama's, and thus there is no
way an employer can legally achieve the condition that the card warrants to
exist. This suggests that the card serves no legitimate purpose. Moreover, a
total ban on the use of such cards would not be inconsistent with the Head
decision.
Another decision construing the Alabama right-to-work statute that de89. 262 Ala. at 90, 77 So.2d at 368.
90. ALA. CODE § 25-7-31 (1975).
91. Cf.Kerkemeyer v. Midkiff, 299 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1957) (employer/barber entitled to retain and display "union shop" card if employee/barbers are all union members, even if employer

is not; portion of agreement purporting to require employers to join a union contrary to public
policy).
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serves mention is Mumford v. Glover. 92 In Mumford it was argued that a
mandatory contribution to a union-administered pension fund violated the Alabama right-to-work law. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed on the grounds that the money went "not to, or for the benefit of, the
union."' 93 On the facts of this case, the decision would seem to be correct. A
contrary result should follow, however, if it were established that the union
was using the fund to its own advantage, as when a union uses its pension fund
investments to achieve organizational or political goals elsewhere.
B. Arkansas
The Arkansas right-to-work statute94 recognizes a liberty to work free
from all union entanglements. The statute contains a somewhat unusual provision that not only recognizes the right of labor to bargain collectively but
9' 5
also protects the "freedom of unorganized labor to bargain individually.
This aspect of the statute, however, has never been enforced 96 and is clearly
preempted by the federal doctrine of exclusive representation. Under this doctrine a majority union has both97the right and the responsibility to bargain on
behalf of everyone in the unit.
Another section of the statute prohibits contracts that exclude from employment persons "who fail or refuse to join, or affiliate with, a labor union
*"98 In Kaiser v. Price-Fewell,Inc.99 the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that an exclusive hiring hall arrangement, though operated on a nondiscriminatory basis, nevertheless required an employee to "affiliate with" a labor
union and was thus illegal under the statute. Subsequently, however, the court
recognized that for businesses in interstate commerce this matter was preempted by federal law. 100 Most of the Arkansas cases were decided before the
Supreme Court's decision in Schemerhorn 11101 and dealt with injunctions
against picketing to obtain union security agreements in violation of state
92. 503 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974).
93. Id at 881 n.2.
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-201 to -205 (1976); see generally Covington, "Freedomto Work"
Act, 1 ARK. L. REv. 204 (1947); Youngdahl, Thirteen Years ofthe "Aight to Work"in Arkansas, 14

ARK. L. REV. 289 (1960). In addition to its right-to-work statute, Arkansas has a provision in its
constitution that broadly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of union membership
or nonmembership. ARK. CONST. amend. 34.
95. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-201 (1976).

96. See Williams v. Arthur J. Arney Co., 240 Ark. 157, 161, 398 S.W.2d 515, 518 (1966)
(Ward, J., dissenting). But cf text accompanying notes 133-43 infra (discussion of individual's
employment rights).
97. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
98. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-203 (1976) (emphasis added).
99. 235 Ark. 295, 359 S.W.2d 449 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); cf. Williams v.
Arthur J. Arney Co., 240 Ark. 157, 398 S.W.2d 515 (1966) (contact requiring union to supply
workers at the request of the employer does not compel involuntary affiliation as a condition of
employment).
100. Hodcarriers Local 1282 v. Cone-Huddleston, Inc., 241 Ark. 140, 406 S.W.2d 366 (1966).
See also, Laborers' Local 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1973).
101. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
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law.' 0 2 Since Schemerhorn II preempted this area, those early cases are no
03
longer of any great importance.'

C. Florida

The state "prohibitions" against compulsory unionism that existed when
the Wagner Act was passed consisted of various common law doctrines giving
employees and employers damages or injunctive relief against union efforts to
maintain closed shops. 1° 4 This was clearly the kind of state law to which the
Wagner Act Congress intended to defer, 10 5 an intention presumably carried
over into section 14(b). On the other hand, at the time section 14(b) was

passed, a number of states had also enacted right-to-work provisions, either by
statute or constitutional amendment. Florida was the first to do so, by consti-

tutional amendment, in 1944.106 This was later reinforced by a statute providing civil remedies and injunctive relief for violations of the constitutional
right. 107

State laws, such as Florida's, that merely prohibit making union "membership" a condition of employment leave open the question whether included
within the ban are also the lesser forms of compulsory unionism, such as
agency shop or fair share arrangements, which do not literally require membership in the union. The first state court to address this issue held that, be-

cause the statute imposed criminal penalties, it should be strictly construed
and not applied to any agreements that do not require actual membership in
the union.' 08 Other state courts, however, consistently have held to the contrary. 10 9
The Florida Supreme Court resolved the issue in Schermerhorn v. Local
1625, Retail Clerks.' 110 The court noted that the state constitution gives employees the right to decide whether to join a labor organization and concluded:

Inasmuch as the Constitution has granted this right, the agency shop
clause is repugnant to the Constitution in that it requires the nonunion employee to purchase from the labor union a right which the
Constitution has given him. The Constitution grants a free choice in
102. See, e.g., Burgess v. Daniel Plumbing & Gas Co., 225 Ark. 792, 285 S.W.2d 517 (1956);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954);
Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W.2d 45 (1950).
103. See Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 397 S.W.2d 789 (1965).
104. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 11-21.
105. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301,
305-06 (1949).
106. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
107. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.17 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
108. Mead Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
109. E.g., Arizona Flame Restaurant, Inc. v. Baldwin, 26 Lab. Cas. 68,647 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
1954), modfed, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957); Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11,360
P.2d 456 cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961); Independent Guard Ass'n Local I v. Wackenhut Serv.,
Inc., 90 Nev. 198, 522 P.2d 1010 (1974); Ficek v. Boilermakers Local 647, 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D.
1974). The attorney generals of two other states also have ruled that the agency shop is prohibited
by their right-to-work laws. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. WW-1018 (1961); Op. S.D. Att'y Gen. 236
(1958).
110. 141 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1962), af'd, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
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the matter of belonging to a labor union. The agency shop clause
contained in the contract under consideration purports to acknowledge that right, but in fact, abrogates it by requiring the non-union
worker to pay the union for the exercise of that right or, in the alternative, to be discharged from his employment."I'
The court's reasoning is a little loose here. It is not completely accurate to
say that an agency shop clause requires an employee, on pain of discharge, to
"purchase" his right to refrain from joining the union; persons who do not
exercise this right, and thus do join the union, are also required to pay the fee.
The obligation to pay, therefore, does not flow exclusively from the exercise of
the right, and the "purchase" analogy seems inapposite. The court would have
been on firmer analytical ground if it simply had said that the payment of
union dues is an inseparable incident of union membership, and the right to
refrain from the latter necessarily emcompasses the right to refrain from the
former.
More recently, in FloridaEducationAssociation v. PublicEmployees Relations Commission,'1 2 a union argued that an agency shop allegedly requiring
nonmembers to pay the full equivalent of union dues and fees, a plan conceded to be illegal by the union, should be distinguished from a fair share
arrangement under which nonmembers are required to pay only a pro rata
share of the costs of collective bargaining. The Florida Court of Appeals,3
however, rejected the distinction as being of bookkeeping significance only.l1
Under federal law the maximum fee allowed under an agency shop clause is
already the equivalent of a fair share of collective bargaining expenses (in
contrast to noncollective bargaining union expenses, which must be paid for
out of voluntary dues only). 1 4 Therefore, if state right-to-work laws could not
prohibit such fair share arrangements, the laws would serve no independent
function at all.
Finally, the Supreme Court decision that limited the power of states to
enjoin picketing directed at obtaining an illegal (under state law) union security agreement arose in Florida." 5 The state supreme court has subsequently
16
recognized its lack of jurisdiction over such matters.
D.

Georgia

Georgia has a broad and comprehensive right-to-work statute 1 7 that is
capable of reaching almost any form of compulsory unionism, the federal preemption doctrine permitting. Mandatory union membership of course is pro111. Id at 272-73.
112. 346 So.2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
113. Id at 553.
114. See Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970).
115. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96 (1963); see text accompanying
notes 57 & 58 supra.
116. Kitchens v. Doe, 194 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1967).
117. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to -909, -9922, -9923 (1974); see generally Willis, Georgia's
Right-to- Work Laws: Their Meaning and Effect, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 164 (1977).
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hibited," 8 as is the requirement that any employee "pay any fee, assessment,
or other sum of money whatsoever, to a labor organization."' 1 9 This broad
language reaches the agency shop, fair share agreements, and even hiring hall
"use fees." Check-off authorizations are unlawful unless "revocable to [sic]
the will of the employee," 120 a provision that the Supreme Court found to be
preempted as to employees covered by the federal labor act.12 1 Collective bargaining agreements containing any of the prohibited requirements are void
and unlawful.' 22 Injunctions and actual damages are available under the
Act, 123 and a violation is a misdemeanor.124
There has not been a great deal of litigation under the statute. In Local
438, Construction & General Laborers' Union v. Curry & Co. 125 the United
States Supreme Court anticipated its SchermerhornII decision and held that
picketing to compel an employer to hire only union labor is arguably an unfair
labor practice under the federal act and is not encompassed by section 14(b);
it. This reversed the
therefore, state courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin
12 6
Georgia Supreme Court on the jurisdiction issue.
On the other hand, in the more recent case of InternationalBrotherhoodof
ElectricalWorkers v. Briscoe,I27 a Georgia court of appeals threaded its way
through the federal preemption doctrine without relying on section 14(b). In
Briscoe, an employee sued the union for tortiously causing the employer to
breach an individual employment contract and discharge the employee because he was not a union member. Underlying the litigation was not the
Georgia right-to-work statute itself, but rather a related statute that makes it
"unlawful for any person

. . .

to compel

. . .

any person to join .

. .

any labor

organization. . . by any threatened or actual interference with the pursuit of
lawful employment by such person .... ,,128 The court held that tortious
interference with an existing contractual relationship, which the statute prohibited, fell within the'general preemption doctrine exception that allows concurrent jurisdiction over matters "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."' 2 9 Apparently the court correctly concluded that it was not
necessary to rely on section 14(b) to reach this result.
Another issue that occasionally comes up under right-to-work statutes is
what effect an illegal provision will have on the remainder of the contract. In
118.
119.
120.
121.

curiam).

GA. CODE ANN. § 54-902 (1974).

Id § 54-903.
Id § 54-906.
Sea Pak v. Industrial, Technical, & Professional Employees, 400 U.S. 985 (1971) (per

122. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-904, -905, -907 (1974).
123. Id § 54-908.
124. Id § 54-9922 (violations of §§ 54-905 and -907 are misdemeanors).
125. 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
126. Curry v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 438, 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962),
rev'd, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
127. 143 Ga. App. 417, 239 S.E.2d 38 (1977).
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-804 (1974).

129. 143 Ga. App. at 423, 239 S.E.2d at 43 (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223,
228 (1970) (Burger, CJ., concurring)).
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Martell v. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp.,130 a Georgia court of appeals noted
that whether a contract is "entire" or "severable" turns on the intent of the
parties, and when there are several promises on each side it is presumed that
the parties intended the legal ones to be severable from the illegal ones. 131 A
suit on the unaffected portion of the agreement thus was allowed.
. Louisiana
The linchpin of federal labor relations is undoubtedly the doctrine of "exclusive representation." Under this doctrine, a union selected by a majority of
the employees is vested by operation of law with the authority to represent and
bind every employee in the unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. 132 As some of its early detractors perceived,
however, the right-to-work principle, carried to its logical conclusion, is fundamentally inconsistent with that doctrine. Right-to-work is premised on the
notion that affiliation or association 'with a labor union, along with other incidents of the employment relationship, should be a matter of individual free
choice rather than of state-backed union coercion. This freedom clearly is
infringed when a union is empowered by law to act as an employee's agent
against his will. For the most part, however, right-to-work legislation has only
dealt with other forms of "association," such as formal membership and payment of dues. In fact, state regulation touching upon the doctrine of exclusive
representation undoubtedly would be preempted by federal law.
Nevertheless, at one point the Louisiana Supreme Court construed that
state's right-to-work law to prohibit involuntary exclusive representation. In
Piegts v. Meat Cutters Local 437,133 a union demanded a contract giving it
exclusive bargaining status, and the employer refused. When the union picketed, the employer sought an injunction. The injunction was granted on the
ground that the contract demanded by the union would violate the statutory
guarantee that the "right of a person

. . .

to work shall not be denied or

abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union
"134

After adopting a dictionary definition of the term "abridge,"' 135 the court
continued:
Would a non-union man's rights be diminished, reduced, curtailed,
or shortened if a union acted as his agent? We answer that question
in the affirmative.
There are instances where the union demands, higher hourly wages
130. 114 Ga. App. 646, 152 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
131. Id at 649, 152 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-504, -112 (1974)). But cf.
Local 234, United Ass'n. of Journeymen v. Henley & Beckwith Inc., 66 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1953)
(closed shop provision was the main inducement for the contract and it was directly tied-in with
other provisions; held to be indivisible).
132. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
133. 228 La. 131, 81 So.2d 835 (1955).
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 882 (West) (repealed 1956).
135. 228 La. at 139-40, 81 So.2d at 838 ("diminished, reduced, curtailed, or shortened").
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and shorter hours. In order to be gainfully employed to support his
family, a non-union man might be willing to make concessions.
Lib36
erty of contract is the non-union man's prerogative.1
The preemption problem aside, the court's conclusion is not all that extraordinary, given the philosophical premise of right-to-work legislation in
general. There were, however, cries of disbelief and outrage from the local
academic community. One commentator, whose exasperation scarcely could
be contained, attacked the court's reasoning on this basis:
[I]t is submitted that this [the union's asserted right to represent nonconsenting employees] does not constitute a violation of the act for
either of two valid reasons: (1) The right abridged is not protected
by the act, and (in the alternative) (2) 137
the abridgement is not on account of non-membership in a union.
On the first point, he argued that the statute merely protects an "unqualified" right to work, while in this case the right allegedly abridged was "the
non-union's man right to work on terms agreeable to himsef-a right ignored

by the statute."' 38 The author seems to be saying that there is something
about the intrinsic nature of the right to work that excludes from its ambit the
kind of claim being advanced in this case; that is, there is a distinction between
an "unqualified" right, which is what the right to work is, and an employee's
asserted right "to work on terms agreeable to himself."' 139 This distinction

cannot withstand analysis. To begin with, it is not clear what the author
means by "unqualified," although there is the suggestion that it means that the
statutory right-to-work is violated only if the employee actually is discharged.
It is clearly inaccurate to characterize right-to-work laws in that fashion, however, as they can be violated not only by discharge but also by the imposition
of lesser sanctions 140 and by other forms of compulsion as well. Moreover, in
both the philosophical and statutory sense, the right to work means exactly
what the author asserts it does not mean, namely that the individual does have
the liberty, free from the interference of third parties, to dictate the terms
under which he is willing to work for a particular employer, assuming the
employer is also willing.' 4' Conceptually, it is no less a violation of this right
for some third party to condition the employee's continued employment on his
willingness to work at the union wage scale than it is to condition it upon his
willingness to become a formal member of the union or pay dues. In sum,
there is nothing flowing from the intrinsic nature, of the right to work that
136. Id
137. Reynard, Labor Law, 16 LA. L. REV. 294, 304 (1956) (emphasis in original).
138. Id

139. Id
140. Right-to-work statutes often expressly prohibit not only discharge because of nonmembership but also similarly based discrimination in regard to wages and other conditions of employment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.17 (West Supp. 1979). The Louisiana statute's prohibition
of abridgement as well as denial of the right-to-work is certainly capable of being construed as
encompassing this lesser kind of sanction.
141. See Haggard, The Right to Work---a ConstitutionalandNaturalLaw Perspective, I J. Soc.
& POL. AFF. 215 (1976); Vieira, Of Syndicalism, Slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 WAKE

FOREST L. REV. 515 (1976).
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prevents it from proscribing exclusive representation as a particular form of
interference with the employment rights of the individual.
With regard to the second point, assuming that the right asserted was of a
kind protected by the statute, the author then argues that the abridgement still
would not be "on account of membership or non-membership in a labor
union," because, in a collective bargaining situation, members and nonmembers alike are deprived of their right to bargain individually.' 4 2 That, however, is simply not so. The formal member is not deprived of his right at all.
On the contrary, he voluntarily relinquishes it when he appoints the union as
his bargaining representative. Moreover, the argument misses the entire thrust
of the court's reasoning. The court was not saying that the individual's right to
bargain for himself is abridged on account of his "non-membership" (in the
formal sense); it was saying that this right was abridged on account of his
forced "membership" (in the statutory sense). That is, in the right-to-work
context, the term "membership" means more than formal membership-it
also includes, as has been seen, the mere payment of money and other forms
of required affiliation or association. It is clearly broad enough to include a
bargaining agent relationship. It is on account of this forced affiliation, or
"membership", that the individual employee is deprived of the liberty to bargain for himself-an abridgement of his "right to work". Thus, while it may
not have been the conscious intent of the Louisiana legislature to prevent a
majority union from obtaining the status of exclusive bargaining agent, such a
reading of the statute is neither illogical nor inconsistent with the underlying
43
philosophical premise of right-to-work legislation.'
The general right-to-work statute under which Pegis was decided subsequently was repealed. 144 It was later reenacted covering agricultural employees only,14 5 and the case is presumably still good law in that context, as such
employees are not covered by any preemptive federal legislation. A second
Louisiana right-to-work law covering all other employees was enacted in
1976.146 The new statute, in addition to prohibiting discrimination against
nonunion members, also prohibits discrimination against members. This portion of the statute, however, was held to be preempted by the federal statute. 14 7 The new Louisiana right-to-work law has not otherwise been
construed by the courts.
142. Reynard, supra note 137, at 305.
143. Cf Local 415, IBEW v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1965) (statute providing that no
employee could be required to have "any connection with" a labor organization held to have been
violated when employer recognized union as exclusive bargaining representative; statute, however, also found to have been preempted by federal law).
144. 1954 La. Acts, No. 252 (repealed 1956).
145. 1956 La. Acts, No. 397 (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-881 to -889 (1977).
146. 1976 La. Acts, No. 97, § 1 (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-981 to -987 (Cum.
Supp. 1980)).
147. Johnson v. Electronic Sales & Serv. Co., 363 So.2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
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E. Mississitopi
Like many states, Mississippi's right-to-work guarantee is contained in
both its constitution and its statutes.1 48 Both are broadly worded prohibitions
against making union membership a condition of employment, whether the
condition is imposed by the employer alone or in agreement with a labor
union. Requiring an employee to pay "any dues, fees or other charges" is also
expressly prohibited, as is any arrangement in which a labor union "acquires
an employment monopoly in any enterprise" 14 9-a provision apparently
aimed at exclusive hiring hall arrangements, despite their preemptive legality
under federal law.
In one early case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that picketing
aimed at obtaining an object illegal under the statute was itself illegal and
subject to being enjoined.1 50 This decision and one other that resolved the
legality of the method by which the constitutional amendment was adopted T1 '
are the only cases dealing with Mississippi's right-to-work guarantee.
G. North Carolina
The North Carolina statute15 2 provided, in part, the backdrop against
which the United States Supreme Court resolved the constitutionality of rightto-work legislation. In State v. Whitaker15 3 defendants, an employer and various union officials, were charged with violating the state right-to-work statute
by maintaining and enforcing a contract provision making union membership
a condition of employment. The principal defense was that the state right-towork statute violated the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Equal protection and free speech claims were also advanced, but the
defendant's main argument was that the law interfered with liberty of contract
guaranteed by the Constitution. Given that labor unions recently had succeeded in destroying "liberty of contract" as an obstacle to the constitutionality of various forms of prolabor, social legislation, 154 it was ironic that the
unions asserted it as a defense to the enforcement of right-to-work laws. Indeed, in this case, the unions were in the unenviable position of having to
argue that the state prohibitions against "yellow dog contracts", contracts be148. MISS. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A; MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1972).
149. MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1972).
150. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 247 Miss. 458, 153 So.2d 695 (1963), rev'd
on othergrounds, 377 U.S. 126 (1964) (Supreme Court held that affected employer's business was
in interstate commerce and that the matter was preempted by federal law).
151. Barnes v. Ladner, 241 Miss. 606, 131 So.2d 458 (1961).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1975); See Survey ofStatutory Changes, 25 N.C.L. REV.
376, 447-48 (1947).
153. 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 860 (1947), aff'dsub nonL, Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
154. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (implicitly overrules
prior cases holding prohibitions against "yellow dog" contracts to be unconstitutional because of
the resulting violation of the liberty of contract); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) holding that minimum
wage laws were a violation of the liberty of contract).
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tween an employer and an employee making nonunion membership a condition of employment, were a proper exercise of the police power, while
prohibitions against compulsory unionism were not, even though both
prohibitions were part and parcel of the same statute. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument.
The court's analysis, though typical of the era, unfortunately does not
shed very much light on underlying constitutional and philosophical issues.
The court first posited the question in terms of liberty of contract versus the
proper exercise of the police power (serving the "public interest"). It then concluded, consistent with extant Supreme Court authority, that the latter would
prevail unless the statute in question was clearly "unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious or lacking in substantial relationship to its objective."'- 5 The court
found those elements to be lacking here.
Toward the close of its opinion, however, the court found it necessary to
balance the union's "right of contract" against the employees' "right to work"
and concluded that the former "cannot be unrestrictedly used to the injury of
another," presumably in the exercise of the latter right.' 5 6 This analysis presupposes the very existence of "conflicting rights" that must be balanced, and
implicitly equates "injury in fact" with the concept of a jural wrong, two debatable jurisprudential points, 57 but ones that cannot be pursued here. Nevertheless, the court would have been on sounder ground if it had recognized
that the normal union security agreement is not at all the product of the liberty
of contract in the traditional sense. Rather, it is the result of governmentallybacked union coercion, which constitutes a jural wrong because it interferes
with the liberty of individual employees to contract with employers on terms
mutually acceptable to both.158 This liberty, however, is protected by right-towork laws, and this should be sufficient to render those laws constitutional, at
least when they are applied in this context.
A more difficult constitutional problem was presented in the companion
case to Whitaker, State v. Bishop.' 5 9 In Bishop the employer, a painting con-

tractor who was apparently an active union member himself, attempted to impose union membership on his employees as a condition of being hired, and he
did this even in the absence of a union security agreement. Here, a legitimate
claim of liberty of contract, in the traditional sense, could have been advanced.' 60 The court, however, merely noted that "[t]he constitutional questions found in the record are not brought forward in the appellant's brief or
argued orally," and further indicated that "[t]he same questions" were raised
and discussed in Whitaker.161
155. 228 N.C. at 367, 45 S.E.2d at 871.
156. Id at 371, 45 S.E.2d at 874.
157. See T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES (1975); R. NOZICK, ANAR-

CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
158. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 290-94.
159. 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d 858 (1947).
160. See Haggard, Right to Work, 11 REASON 1, 34 (1979).
161. 228 N.C. at 373, 45 S.E.2d at 859.
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Whitaker case was
consolidated with a Nebraska case that raised the same constitutional issues. 162 A case dealing with the right-to-work amendment to the Arizona
Constitution also was decided at this time. 163 The Court found all three state
statutes to be constitutional and rejected the unions' claims that the laws violated the first amendment, the "obligations of contracts" clause, the equal protection clause, and the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.164
This finally resolved the constitutional issue.
Unlike most state right-to-work laws, the North Carolina statute does not
expressly provide for criminal sanctions. In Bishop, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that when a statute, in the public interest, requires
that an act be done or not be done, a breach of the duty so imposed constitutes
a misdemeanor, as at common law, even though the statute itself is silent on
the matter.' 65 The court thus affirmed the conviction and imposition of a fifty
dollar fine against a defendant who had discharged an employee because of
the latter's nonmembership in labor union.
In the normal right-to-work case, when an employee is discharged because of an express union security provision in a collective bargaining agreement, there is usually no problem of proving that the employee's
nonmembership in the union was the cause of the discharge. When the employer acts unilaterally or merely at the often unprovable request of the union,
however, such a problem can exist, especially when other nonprohibited
grounds for discharge are also present. The question is whether the cause for
the discharge was an activity protected by the right-to-work statute or was
something else. In Willardv. Huffman' 66 the issue arose in the reverse context.
The employees claimed that they were fired because of their union membership and organizing activities, while the employer claimed that they were fired
because they had been drinking on the job. The trial court instructed the jury
to find for the plaintiff if "the sole reason or one of the reasons"' 67 for plaintiff's discharge was his membership in the union. The jury found for plaintiff
and the defendant challenged the italicized portion of the instruction. The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Borrowing, appropriately enough,
the test that had been developed under the analogous federal statute, the court
held that in order to recover under the statute, "the jury must find that the
discharge resulted solely from the plaintiffs exercise of rights protected under
the Act, or that the plaintiffs exercise of such rights was the motivating or
moving cause for such discharge ....
,,168 Presumably, even though the fed162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
335 U.S. at 529-36.
228 N.C. at 373-74, 45 S.E.2d at 859.
247 N.C. 523, 101 S.E.2d 373 (1958).
Id at 526, 101 S.E.2d at 375 (emphasis added).
Id at 528, 101 S.E.2d at 377.

NORTH CA4ROLINA LAWREVIEW

[Vol.
[o5 59

eral test for a finding of discriminatory discharge is now arguably different, 169
the test stated by the North Carolina court is still controlling and also would
be applied when the discharge allegedly was caused by an employee's refusal
to join the union.
In Willard, defendant attempted to argue the preemption issue, but the
Supreme Court refused to consider it, saying that the matter should be raised
when the case was heard at retrial.' 70 Eventually, however, the preemption
issue did come back to the supreme court in a second Willard v. Huffman 171
case. In the second Willard case, defendant-employer was technically in interstate commerce and his conduct was clearly prohibited by federal law. The
case, however, did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the NLRB, and
the Board accordingly refused to issue a complaint. 17 2 The case thus fell
within the "no man's land" created by the Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah
Labor RelationsBoard.173 In Guss the Court held that, even if the Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction, a state court does not have the power to deal
with matters otherwise preempted by federal law unless the Board expressly
has delegated such authority to the state, a delegation that had not been made
in this case. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, thought it unconscionable for a plaintiff to have no forum in which to assert the clear infringement of a statutory right. Accordingly, the court characterized plaintiff's claim
as one "for damages in tort" 174 and thus artificially fit it into one of the existing exceptions to the preemption doctrine. Although the court's reasoning is
a bit strained, the result it reached was soon ratified by an amendment to the
Taft-Hartley Act that gives state courts jurisdiction over otherwise preempted
17 5
matters if the Board declines to exercise jurisdiction.
A demonstration of how a labor union may attempt to impose compulsory unionism indirectly, that is, without resort to an express union security
agreement, can be found in Poole & Kent Corp. v. Thurston & Sons, Inc. 76 In
Poole plaintiff contracted for defendant to perform certain work at a construction site. The contract provided that "[a]ll labor used throughout the work
shall be acceptable to the Contractor [plaintiff] and of a standing or affiliation
that will permit the work to be carried on harmoniously and without delay. . .. 177 At the time the contract was signed defendant was a party to a
collective bargaining agreement with a local union. It is not clear from the
facts whether all of defendant's employees were union members at this time.
The collective bargaining agreement expired, the union refused to sign an169. Compare NLRB v. Pioneer Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d 301, 307 (1st Cir.), cer. denied, 389
U.S. 929 (1967) with NLRB v. George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc., 451 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1971).
170. 247 N.C. at 528, 101 S.E.2d at 377.
171. 250 N.C. 396, 109 S.E.2d 233 (1959).
172. Id. at 399, 109 S.E.2d at 235.
173. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
174. 250 N.C. at 408, 109 S.E.2d at 242.
175. Labor-Management Relations Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c)(2) (1976)).
176. 286 N.C. 121, 209 S.E.2d 450 (1974).
177. Id. at 122, 209 S.E.2d at 451.

1980]

RIGHT-TO- WORK LAWS

other agreement unless defendant opened a permanent office in the area,
which defendant refused to do, and thereafter the defendant "hired employees
to work... irrespective of their membership or non-membership in a labor
union."178 The union then began to picket the construction site, causing the
employees of plaintiff and other subcontractors to refuse to work. Plaintiff
then sent a telegraph to defendant, claiming that "the men which you have
working on the... project are not working under the terms of a union collective bargaining agreement" and threatened to take "steps" unless the situation
was corrected. 17 9 Defendant, however, did nothing. Plaintiff then declared
the contract cancelled, because of defendant's breach, and sued to enjoin defendant or his employees from working further at the job site. Defendant
counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking damages.
The issue was whether the "unacceptability" or lack of "standing or affiliation" of defendant's employees was of a kind contemplated by the contract.
In resolving this issue, the court said it would presume that the parties to the
contract were aware of the prohibitions of the North Carolina right-to-work
statute. It thus concluded that the cancellation was unwarranted, because it
was done "upon the sole ground [that defendant's] force was not operating
80
under a union contract.'
The court's reasoning is somewhat troublesome. There is a clear difference between a workforce that is employed under a collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and an exclusive union representative, which
right-to-work statutes cannot prohibit, and a workforce that is required to become members of a union as a condition of employment, which right-to-work
statutes can prohibit. What the court seemed to object to was plaintiff's attempt to require defendant to enter into a second collective bargaining agreement with the union. That objective, however, is not prohibited by the rightto-work statute on which the court relied.
On the other hand, there were ample facts in the record to support a reliance on the statute. The trial court, for example, found that various union
representatives had advised "plaintiff to have the defendant removed from the
construction project because its employees were not members of the local
union .... ,,l81 Similarly, in its pleadings plaintiff apparently had claimed
that the other employees had refused to work "until such time as defendant
either negotiates a collective bargaining agreement or desists [from] the employment of non-union labor."' 8 2 Therefore, to the extent that the "unacceptability" of defendant's employees related to their nonmembership in the
union, this was not the kind of unacceptability contemplated by the employ178. Id. at 127, 209 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting trial court opinion).
179. Id. at 124, 209 S.E.2d at 452.
180. Id. at 129, 209 S.E.2d at 455.
181. Id. at 124, 209 S.E.2d at 452.
182. Pool & Kent Corp. v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 1, 3, 203 S.E.2d 74, 75
(1974) (court of appeals decision quoting plaintiffs complaint); butsee 286 N.C. at 123, 209 S.E.2d
at 451 (employees refused to work "until Thurston renewed its contract [collective bargaining
agreement] with the. . . Union or was removed from the job.").
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ment contract, assuming, as the court did, the parties' deference to the provisions of the state right-to-work law. Thus plaintiff's cancellation of the
contract was wrongful.
The court faced a somewhat less complicated issue in the case of In re
PortPublishingCo. 183 In In rePort the employer, whose collective bargaining
agreement with the union contained an illegal union security provision, went
bankrupt. The employees then brought suit under the contract to recover vacation and severance pay. The trustee in bankruptcy defended on the ground
that the entire contract was void because of the illegal provision, but the court
found the illegal provision to be severable from the rest of the contract. "[Ilt is
only when the illegal element in a contract permeates the entire agreement,"
84
the court held, "that such a contract is void in its entirety."'
Finally, the North Carlina Supreme Court has recognized, as have other
courts, that the provisions of its state right-to-work law do not extend to employees covered by the Railway Labor Act. In Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad,185 the court noted that the Railway Labor Act' 8 6 contains no provision analogous to section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Moreover, the railway
statute expressly authorizes union security agreements, "[n]otwithstanding any
other provisions
of this chapter or of any other statute or law. . . of any
87
State."1

H. South Carolina

The South Carolina right-to-work law' 88 is similar to most other southern
right-to-work statutes, but generally has been construed more liberally than
any of the others-sometimes reasonably so, sometimes not. The court in one
of the first cases decided under the statute, however, arguably read it too narrowly. In Friendy Society of Engravers v. Calico Engraving Co. ,189 the employer allegedly made disparaging remarks against the union, tried to induce
employees to quit the union, and engaged in other questionable activities. The
union brought suit under the state right-to-work law, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim. The court
pointed out that the "statute was clearly intended to preserve the right of laboring men to employment notwithstanding closed shop agreements entered
into between employers and labor unions, not to confer upon labor unions the
right to recover. . . because of unfair labor practices."' 190 The court added
that if the statute were intended to apply to unfair labor practices, it would be
preempted by federal law. The court undoubtedly was right about the merits
of the union's claim, but on the other hand, the South Carolina right-to-work
183. 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
184. Id. at 398, 57 S.E.2d at 368.
185. 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955).

186. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 152(11) (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE §§ 41-7-10 to -7-90 (1976).
238 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 935 (1957).
Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
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statute clearly was intended to extend beyond a mere prohibition of "closed
shop agreements." The statute also proscribes the lesser forms of compulsory
unionism, such as the union shop and the agency shop.
A form of compulsory unionism that the statute probably cannot prohibit
was found, however, to be within the ambit of the statute in Branham v. Miller
Electric Co. 191 In Branham plaintiff-employee, a union member, allegedly

had engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage and was thus "not in good
standing with the union."' 192 As a result, the union refused to refer him back
to work, and the employer would not accept him without the union's approval.
The employee sued under the right-to-work law. Defendant-employer argued
that the statute operated in derogation of freedom of contract and thus should
be narrowly construed. Therefore, because plaintiffs discharge was based on
than on his membership or nonmemberthe union's refusal to refer him rather
193
ship, the statute was not violated.
The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to adopt that narrow reading
of the statute. Freedom of contract, the court said, was subordinate to public
policy, and a statute declaring public policy was to be construed liberally.
Thus, "an act that violates the general policy and spirit of the statute is no less
194
within its condemnation than one that is in literal conflict with its terms."'
The court went on to say that the statute was directed at two evils: "(1)
union control of employment on the one hand; and (2) employer boycott of, or
insistence upon, union labor on the other."' 195 The first evil, the court said,
was encompassed by the statutory prohibition against a labor union acquiring
"an employment monopoly in any enterprise."' 196 Citing Nevada and Texas
cases 197 in which hiring hall arrangements were found to be in violation of the
state right-to-work statutes, the court continued:
[W]e can perceive no sound distinction between an agreement to hire
only through the union and one to hire only such persons as have
been cleared through or referred or approved by it. In either case it
would be certain, as a practical matter, that only union members in
good standing would be employed. In either case the "employment
98
monopoly" forbidden by.

.

. our statute would be assured.'

The court's conclusion that a union in this situation would always refer
on a discriminatory basis was probably unwarranted. In any event, the observation was gratuitous, as the court clearly predicated its finding of illegality on
the employer's practice of looking exclusively to the union for approval before
191. 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167 (1961).
192. Id. at 542, 118 S.E.2d at 168.
193. Id. at 545, 118 S.E.2d at 169.
194. Id. at 546, 118 S.E.2d at 170.
195. Id.
196. S.C. CODE § 41-7-20 (1976).
197. Building Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 295 (1955); Sheet Metal Workers
Local 175 v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683 (rex Civ. App. 1951) (per curiam). In both cases, however,
discrimination on the basis of union membership was either assumed or apparent on the face of
the agreement itself.
198. 237 S.C. at 547, 118 S.E.2d at 170.
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it would reinstate the plaintiff, thus giving the union an "employment monopoly," as in the exclusive hiring hall situation. To the extent that the Branham
decision is predicated on this theory, it is now preempted. Exclusive and nondiscriminatory hiring hall arrangements are permitted by federal law, and this
permission supersedes any state laws to the contrary.' 99

It was unnecessary, however, for the Branham court to decide the case on
the basis of an "exclusivity" or "monopoly" theory. The reason plaintiff was
not referred by the union and thus the reason he was not reinstated was that he
was not a member of the union "in good standing". The right-to-work prohibition against discrimination on the basis of "membership" is easily broad
enough to encompass discrimination on the basis of one's standing as a union
member.20 0 In addition, even in a full-blown hiring hall situation, the application of a state right-to-work law to this type of discrimination should not be
preempted, even though that discrimination also is prohibited by the federal
statute.20 1 Thus, the result reached in the Branham case is still good law.
A practice with overtones of an illegal mandatory check-off and a hiring
hall "use fee" was challenged in Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear,Inc..202 In Kimbrell, plaintiff-employees' contract provided for vacation pay. When it became due, they were told by the defendant-employer that the pay would be
distributed through the local offices of the defendant union, even though these
employees were not members of the union. When the employees went to get
their pay, they discovered that the union had deducted over thirty-eight dollars from each check as a "service fee." Plaintiffs alleged an illegal conspiracy
under the right-to-work law. Defendants, however, claimed federal preemption. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the defense, basing20its3 decision on the "of local concern" exception to the preemption doctrine.
It was unnecessary for the court to rely on that somewhat uncertain exception. Because "membership" in the union security and right-to-work context necessarily includes the mere payment of money to a union, the practice
here constituted a literal violation of the right-to-work statute, and no authority other than section 14(b) was necessary for the state law to be deemed applicable. In fact, in a later case with almost identical facts, a federal district court
rejected the defense of federal preemption on just that basis, saying that "what
is the enforcement of a state statute, specifiis involved in these proceedings
' '2 4
cally authorized by Congress.
199. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
200. See NLRB v. Waterfront Employers of Wash., 211 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1954); Local 1437,
United Bhd. of Carpenter's, 210 N.L.R.B. Dec. 359 (1974).
201. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
202. 239 S.C. 415, 123 S.E.2d 524 (1962).
203. Id. at 420-22, 123 S.E.2d at 526-27.
204. Chapman v. Southeast Region, I.L.G.W.U. Health & Welfare Recreation Fund, 280 F.
Supp. 766, 773 (D.S.C.), appealdirmissed, 401 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1968). Defendants in Chapman
sought to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration of the vacation pay dispute. The court,
however, found that the normal federal policy of deferring to arbitration was inappropriate in this
case. "Shall the rights of the plaintiffs, based on a legal statutory right, be committed for determination to a quasi-judicial tribunal, selected by its adversary, before which it is represented exclusively by its adversary, and whose decision, even if based upon error of fact or law, is final and

1980]

RIGHT-TO- WORK LAWS

The South Carolina right-to-work law was also applied broadly, but legitimately, in Gregory Electric Co. v. Custodis Construction Co. 205 In Gregory
plaintiff had been employed by defendant as a subcontractor. When plaintiffs
employees arrived at the construction site, however, defendant refused to allow them to enter, allegedly because they were not members of the union with
whom defendant had an agreement. Plaintiff sued for a tortious termination
of the contract. Two questions were before the court: (1) whether a violation
of the right-to-work statute gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort; and
(2) whether a person in plaintiffs position has standing to assert such a
2 o6
claim.
On the first issue the court read prior South Carolina Supreme Court
cases to stand for the proposition that a tort action could be predicated on a
claimed violation of this statutory duty. The second issue, however, was
slightly more difficult. It was conceded that plaintiff had no direct claim under
the right-to-work statute, because the employer duty created by the statute is
one that flows to that employer's own employees, not to other employees such
as plaintiff. On the other hand, it was also clear that if the persons who were
refused admission to the construction site had been defendant's own employees, a violation would have existed. The court thus held that the relationship
created by the contract between plaintiff and defendant, which the court said
was "similar to an employment contract" 20 7 and which made plaintiff an intermediary between his own employees and defendant, was of such a nature
that defendant's "legal obligation to refrain from conduct proscribed by the
Right to Work Law extended to" plaintiff as well. 208 Thus, a person who is
injured as a foreseeable consequence of another person's violation of the rightto-work statute can sue in tort, even though the statutory duty breached is
technically owed to someone else. This is an imminently sound legal theory,
and one that the South Carolina Supreme Court could have followed in a
subsequent case.
In that later case, Layne v. ElectricalWorkers Local 387,209 plaintiff was
expelled from the union because he had accepted work at a construction site
where nonunion electricians were also working. As a result of his expulsion,
plaintiff lost his eligibility to receive benefits from the union pension fund to
which he had been contributing for over thirty-five years. The South Carolina
Supreme Court found that plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to show a violation of the right-to-work statute and held that plaintiffs complaint thus stated
a cause of action sounding in tort.2 10 The court's reasoning, however, alconclusive?" Id. at 771. See also Chapman v. Southeast Region, I.L.G.W.U. Health & Welfare
Recreation Fund, 265 F. Supp. 675 (D.S.C. 1967) (concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over
mixed contract/right-to-work claims).
205. 312 F. Supp. 300 (D.S.C. 1970).
206. Id. at 302.
207. Id. at 304.
208. Id.
209. 271 S.C. 346, 247 S.E.2d 346 (1978).
210. Id. at 350, 247 S.E.2d at 348.
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though not necessarily the result, is questionable.
The court predicated its finding on two sections of the statute. Section 417-70 makes it unlawful for any person "by force, intimidation, violence or
threats thereof ... directed against

. .

any person

. . .

to interfere, or at-

tempt to interfere, with such person in the exercise of his right to work.
• ..,,211 Section 41-7-10 more broadly declares "the public policy of this State
that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account2of
12
membership or nonimembership in any labor union cr labor organization."
The relationship between these two sections is an interesting one. One may
concede at the onset that the statutory guarantee of a right to work conceivably is broad enough to prohibit almost any conduct designed to affect a person's decision to work or accept a job. Section 41-7-70 identifies a particular
kind of conduct that is prohibited--"force, intimidation, violence or threats
thereof'--and is not limited with respect to the motive for such conduct. Section 41-7-10, on the other hand, identifies a particularly proscribed motive but
is not limited with respect to the type of conduct used to achieve that motive.
The court said that based on "the facts alleged in the complaint, it can
be said that the union's actions constituted coercion and intimidareasonably
tion" 2 13 in violation of section 41-7-70. It is not clear, however, why that is so.
There was certainly no violence in the traditional sense, which is the kind of
conduct right-to-work provisions of this sort usually are directed at. Moreover, even though the court noted that plaintiff also had brought suit in federal
court claiming that the expulsion violated the provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 2 14 the finding of "coerciveness" under
the state statute apparently was not predicated on a finding that the expulsion
was "wrongful" under some other statute. The only other theory that the court
might have had in mind was that, because the objective was an impermissible
one, the union's conduct was necessarly "coercive." As has been pointed out
before, 2 15 however, that is simply bootstrap reasoning. When the objective is
clearly proscribed and the only issue is whether the means used to achieve it
are of the 'coercive" variety, the illegality of the object itself, standing alone, is
clearly insufficient to establish such coerciveness; otherwise, one is reading out
of the statute its unique characteristic, namely that it identifies a particular
kind of conduct that is prohibited.
The court's reasoning with respect to section 41-7-10 is no more persuasive. The court noted that this section
states that it is "the public policy of this state that the right of persons
to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or
nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization." It was
precisely on account of the plaintiffs membership that he was not
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

S.C. CODE § 41-7-70 (1976).
Id. § 41-7-10.
271 S.C. at 350, 247 S.E.2d at 348.
29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
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free to choose his own employment with
2 16the free exercise of his right
to work being abridged by the union.
That, however, is simply a clever play on words. The phrase "on account
of' in the statute obviously refers to the motive behind the conduct, that is, it
cannot be because the person is a member or a nonmember of the union. It is
not likely that the phrase was intended to refer to any other kind of causal
relation, as when a limitation on one's freedom to work is simply a necessary
incident of union membership itself. In other words, plaintiff here was not
expelled because he was a member or a nonmember but because he arguably
did not meet his voluntarily assumed obligations of membership. Expulsion
for this reason is not proscribed by the statute.
The overbreadth of the court's reasoning can readily be seen in an analogous context. Suppose that a union calls an economic strike. A union member, however, crosses the picket line and continues to work. Pursuant to the
provisions of the union constitution the member is fined. 2 17 This operates in
literal derogation of the employee's "freedom to work" and, in the sense used
by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the imposition of the fine is also "on
account of" the employee's membership in the union. That union conduct,
however, hardly can be characterized as a form of "compulsory unionism," the
evil to which right-to-work laws are properly addressed.
Put differently, plaintiff in this case was not alleging a violation of his
right to work in the statutory sense-the right to have his membership or nonmembership in a labor union treated as a totally irrelevant factor in the employment process. Rather, he was actually asserting a nonexistent right to
union membership-the right to be a union member without at the same time
being bound by certain obligations of membership. Whether or not the states
have the power to regulate the incidents of the union/member relationship, it
seems reasonably clear that South Carolina did not intend to do so directly in
its right-to-work statute.
Nevertheless, the decision can be justified on other grounds. The union
did not expell plaintiff because his actions were inconsistent with some legitimate union objective, for example, by refusing to honor a primary picket line
in an economic dispute. Sanctioning members for such conduct is not a direct
or indirect violation of anyone's right to work. In this case, however, one may
reasonably presume that the union's ultimate objective was the establishment
of defacto union shop conditions at construction sites throughout the state, an
objective it sought to achieve by requiring its members to boycott those sites.
In short, the union, in violation of the statutory rights of nonunion workers,
was seeking "to affect . .. [an] arrangement" 2 18 with employers whereby

union "membership is made a condition of employment." 2 19 Moreover, requiring its members, upon pain of expulsion, to boycott construction sites that
216.
217.
218.
219.

271 S.C. at 351, 247 S.E.2d at 349.
See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
S.C. CODE § 41-7-50 (1976).
Id. § 41-7-20.
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used nonunion electricians was part and parcel of this violation. It is at this
point that the court could have used Judge Hemphill's GregoryElectric theory.
That is, even though the duty breached by the union was one technically owed
to someone else, the manner in which it was breached made injury to plaintiff
a reasonably foreseeable consequence. Thus, a cause of action sounding in
tort arose on behalf of plaintiff. So construed, and narrowed, the Layne decision is a correct one.
I

Tennessee

Union liability under right-to-work statutes normally involves some
nexus with an employer, because it is usually through the employer that the
employee's right actually is violated. The Tennessee Supreme Court has construed portions of that state's right-to-work statute as not applying to union
conduct at all. In Dukes v. PaintersLocal 437,220 defendant-union allegedly
had procured the discharge of plaintiff because he had been expelled from the
union. In an unduly narrow reading of the statute, the court held that the
sections of the right-to-work statute relied on by plaintiff22 1 "[were] directed
toward the employer" 22 2 and not to union conduct of this variety. One of the
sections of the statute makes it "unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or
association of any kind to deny or attempt to deny employment to any person
by reasons of such person's membership in, affiliation with, resignation from,
or refusal to join or affiliate with any labor union." 223 The argument, apparently, was that because the union was not the employer, it was in no position
to "deny employment" and was not capable of violating this section of the act.
One could, however, consistently with the probable intent of the legislature,
read the "attempt to deny" language as encompassing the union conduct involved here. Another section, though not expressly relied on by plaintiff,
makes it unlawful for anyone to enter into any "combination or agreement
...

providing for exclusion from employment of any person because of...

resignation from, or refusal to join or affiliate with any labor union ....,"224
This section too is rather inartfully drafted, for it arguably does not apply to
even an express agreement that makes expulsion from union membership a
grounds for discharge from employment. Assuming, however, that the statute
is not read so literally, it would be reasonable to find, when a union causes an
employer to discharge an employee for nonmembership, that there existed a
"combination" or even an implied "agreement" in violation of the statute.
The Dukes court, however, did find that plaintiff had stated a common
law cause of action for tortious interference with an employment relationship,225 and it is on this basis that Tennessee law has proscribed union conduct
220. 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W.2d 7 (1950).
221. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to 212 (1977).
222. 191 Tenn. at 499, 235 S.W.2d at 9.
223. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-208 (1977).

224. Id. § 50-209.
225. 191 Tenn. at 501, 235 S.W.2d at 10.
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that is directly prohibited in other states by fight-to-work statutes. In Large v.
Dick,226 for example, the court stated:
We can find nothing in the law of this state to justify such an exertion
of the combined power of a union against an individual to deny him
the right to work because he is not affiliated with a union. On the
contrary, the traditional common-law view was that such a combination was illegal as 2an
unreasonable restraint upon trade, and was a
"civil conspiracy." 27
The Tennessee approach raises an interesting preemption question. Section 14(b) provides that fight-to-work statutes are not preempted. It could be
argued, however, that this kind of union conduct is not encompassed by the
right-to-work statute and clearly is an unfair labor practice under the federal
act, and any state common-law remedies should be considered preempted.
The answer is two-fold. First, by focusing on the traditional tort aspect of the
case, one could attempt to bring it within the "of local concern" exception to
the general preemption doctrine. 228 There is, however, an easier route to the
same result. Conceding that the issue is primarily one of labor relations, one
could argue that the common-law approach to compulsory unionism is as fully
covered by section 14(b) as is the statutory or constitutional approach. Congress wrote the Wagner Act with the intent of deferring to the states on the
matter of compulsory unionism. Because there were no right-to-work laws
when section 14(b) became law, 229 Congress clearly was deferring to the various common-law prohibitions. In addition,, because section 14(b) was
designed merely to make express what the Wagner Act Congress had left implicit, 230 it necessarily follows that section 14(b) also brings state common-law
approaches within its ambit of protection, regardless of the existence of right231
to-work statutes.
The Dukes assertion that the right-to-work statute does not apply directly
to unions (except, of course, when they are parties to an express agreement)
has not only been circumvented by the common-law approach to the problem
of union-induced discharges but also has been qualified by later decisions.
For example, in Electrical Workers Local 1925 v. O'Brien,23 2 where the union
was picketing to obtain closed shop conditions, the Tennessee Supreme Court
noted with apparent approval that the chancellor "considered this to be a violation of at least the spirit of the right to work law" 233 and thus upheld the
226. 207 Tenn. 664, 343 S.W.2d 693 (1961). See 28 TENN. L. REV. 578 (1961). See also,
Schwab v. Bridge Workers Local 782, 482 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
227. 207 Tenn. at 668, 343 S.W.2d at 694-95 (citations omitted).
228. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
229. See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301, 305-06 (1948).
230. See generally I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 564 (1948).
231. See generally T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 161-63.
232. 202 Tenn. 38, 302 S.W.2d 60 (1957).
233. Id. at 43, 302 S.W.2d at 63.
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injunction. In addition, in Flatt v. Barbers' Union,2 34 the court stated without
qualification that the union's picketing to induce a barber/owner to join the
union was "contrary to our 'Right to Work' statute. '2 35 Of course, picketing
also has been enjoined on the authority of the right-to-work statute, notwithstanding the preemption doctrine, when the contract
term that the union was
236
picketing to obtain would itself have been illegal.
Although the general rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that an illegal
union security provision does not void the entire contract, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, in Finchum Steel Erection Corp. v. Local 384, International
Association of Bridge Workers,2 37 refused to afford such a contract any legal
standing. Plaintiff in Finchum had a contract to perform certain construction
work and in that contract had agreed "to furnish union labor, equipment, and
tools. '238 After a union member had an altercation with one of plaintiff's
managerial employees, the union pulled all of its members off the job. Plaintiff requested that the union supply other workers, but the union refused, thus
necessitating the termination of the contract between plaintiff and the general
contractor. Plaintiff then sued the union under a Tennessee statute that makes
it illegal to cause or induce another party to breach a contract. The court,
however, noted that the statute applied only to "lawful" contracts; therefore,
because the contract that the union caused to be breached contained a provision requiring all union labor, which the court said was illegal under the right"to be made the basis for the assertion
to-work statute, it could not be allowed
' 239
of lawful rights and obligations.

An interesting choice of law question arose in the case of Martin v. Dealers Transport Co. ,240 which was a suit to enjoin the enforcement within the
state of a collective bargaining agreement between defendant employer and
the union. The agreement, apparently signed in Kentucky, covered operations
in several states, including Tennessee. Among other things, the contract gave
union members the exclusive right to all work "originating out of" the Louisville, Kentucky branch of the employer's business. 24 1 Some of this work, however, had to be processed through the Memphis, Tennessee terminal. Plaintiffs
claimed that the enforcement of this provision in Tennessee would violate the
state right-to-work law. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that, because
the agreement was legal in Kentucky, it should be treated as legal in Tennessee under a "full faith and credit" kind of reasoning. In rejecting that argument, the court relied on an exception to the general choice of law rule: when
a contract legal in the state of signing nevertheless "violates the fixed public
234. 202 Tenn. 345, 304 S.W.2d 329 (1957).
235. Id. at 349, 304 S.W.2d at 330.
236. Pruitt v. Lambert, 201 Tenn. 291, 298 S.W.2d 795 (1957).
237. 202 Tenn. 580, 308 S.W.2d 381 (1957). Cf. United Steelworkers v. Knoxville Iron Co.,
162 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1958) (refusal to enforce a patently illegal union security agreement).
238. 202 Tenn. at 582, 308 S.W.2d at 382.
239. Id. at 587, 308 S.W.2d at 384.
240. 48 Tenn. App. 1, 342 S.W.2d 245 (1960).
241. Id. at 4, 342 S.W.2d at 246.
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policy of the state in which the action is brought, it will not be enforced.... "242
The court can also be viewed as holding that the validity and enforceabil-

ity of a union security agreement is determined by reference to the law of the
state where the work is performed rather than the law of the state where the

with the
contract is signed.243 So construed, the decision is entirely consistent
44
United States Supreme Court's later decision in Mobil Oil.2

J

Texas
The Texas right-to-work statutes are an integral part of a fairly extensive

scheme of regulation of labor unions, much of which clearly is preempted by

federal law.2 45 Indeed, most of the suits filed under the right-to-work sections
have been seeking either injunctions against picketing24 6 or redress for alleged

discrimination against union members 247 -matters that are either preempted
or not true instances of "compulsory unionism."
Not all of the right-to-work provisions, however, have been preempted.
For example, article 5154a, section 8a makes it unlawful for a labor union to
demand "any fee, assessment, or sum of money whatsoever, as a work permit
or as a condition for the privilege to work from any person not a member of
the union, '2 48 a section that has been construed by the Texas Attorney Gen-

eral as including agency shop agreements. 249 Article 5154g more broadly declares "the public policy of the State of Texas tfaat the right of persons to work

shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization and that in the exercise of such
rights all persons shall be free from threats, force, intimidation or coercion."2 50 Finally, in an extremely broad statement, article 5207a provides that
the "inherent right of a person to work and bargainfreely with his employer,
individually or collectively, for terms and conditions of his employment shall

not be denied or infringed by law, or by any organization of whatever na242. Id. at 10, 342 S.W.2d at 249 (citing 17 C.LS. Contracts § 16, 618 (1963)).
243. Cf. Lewis v. Fentress Coal & Coke Co., 160 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), a'dper
curlam, 264 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1959) (a contract, even if valid where signed, is presumed not to be
intended to apply if it would be illegal where performed).
244. Oil Workers Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
245. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Stephens, 437 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1969).
246. See, eg., Construction & Gepq-Labor Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434,225 S.W.2d
958 (1950); Carpenters Local 1097 v. Hampton, 457 S.W.2d 299 (rex. Civ. App. 1970); Texas State
Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc. 246 S.W.2d 938 (rex. Civ. App. 1952); Sheet Metal Workers Local 175 v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683 (rex. Civ. App. 1951).
247. See, eg., Balderas v. La Casita Farms, Inc., 500 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1974); Lunsford v.
City of Bryan,156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115 (1957); Leiter Mfg. Co. v. ILGWU, 269 S.W.2d 409
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Local 324, IBEW v. Upshur-Rural Elec. Coop., 261 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
248. Tax. REV. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a, § 8a (Vernon 1970). An express prohibition of
involuntary check-off arrangements is also contained in id. art. 5154e.
249. Op. Tex. Atty Gen. WW-1018 (1961).
250. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154g, § I (Vernon 1970).
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An opportunity to apply this guarantee of the right of the individual to
bargain for himself arguably was presented in UnitedFarm Workers Organizing Committee v. La Casita Farms,Inc.252 In that case the district court had
enjoined picketing by the union on the ground that the objective of the picketing was proscribed by the right-to-work provisions. The Court of Civil Appeals disagreed:
The conclusion that the picketing was aimed at realization of objectives condemned by the Right to Work Law is based on findings that
Union was attempting to coerce Company to hire only Union members and to force Company's employees to join Union. There is no
evidence to support these findings. It is undisputed that Union
hoped to organize all agricultural workers in the county. Nothing in
Article 5207a guarantees that employers shall have available a supply of unorganized labor. The statute contains no language making
it unlawful for a253union to aim for complete success in its organizational activities.
Although the facts are not clear, it would appear, and is highly probable, that
the picketing was also "recognitional" in its objective. That is, it was intended
to induce the employer to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the workers, whether "organized" or not. If this were so, the
rights of individual workers to bargain for themselves were indeed at stake.
The court, however, did not address the issue.
In UnitedAssociationofJourneymen v. Borden,254 plaintiff sued the union
in tort, alleging that the union business manager had threatened to keep and
apparently succeeded in keeping plaintiff from working on a construction job
for which he had been hired, thus interfering with his statutory right to work.
That plaintiff was a union member, however, caused a problem because the
general rule is that "a union representative is to be regarded as an agent for all
its members in everything he does."'255 In short, because the business manager
was plaintiffs agent, plaintiff was legally responsible for his own injury! The
Supreme Court of Texas was not convinced by that bit of contrived reasoning,
however, and held that "[t]he wrongful act will not be imputed to an injured
member if committed256in the course of an undertaking that is strictly adverse to
the latter's interests.
K

Virginia
The Virginia right-to-work statute25 7 has not been the subject of a great

251. Id. art. 5207a, § I (emphasis added).
252. 439 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
253. Id. at 400 n. 1.
254. 160 Tex. 203, 328 S.W.2d 739 (1959).
255. Id. at 208, 328 S.W.2d at 742.
256. Id.
257. VA. CODE §§ 40.1-58 to .1-69 (1976) (constitutionality upheld in Finney v. Hawkins, 189
Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
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deal of litigation, and apart from a case applying the statute to a federal enclave, 258 most of the litigation has not raised any difficult analytical problems.
In Jenkins v. Rumsfeld,259 for example, plaintiffs alleged that the statute was
"violated" by a federal law that prohibited army band members from performing off post in competition with local civilian musicians. Although the
prohibition did infringe plaintiffs' right to work in a literal sense, the federal
district court, without having to reach the supremacy clause issue, found that
the "policy of the Virginia Act is to assure that a person's right to work shall
'260
not be abridged on account of membership or non-membership in a union.
Because the federal statute did not discriminate26on that basis, it was not even
potentially in conflict with the Virginia statute. '
In PaintersLocal 1018 v. Rountree Corp.,262 another rather simple case,

the court recognized that picketing to "unionize" a particular employer is not
picketing to obtain an objective necessarily illegal under the right-to-work
statute, even though it in fact may induce the employer to do something that is
illegal under
the statute. Rather, some proof of that additional motive must be
263
made.
A more interesting point is raised by Moore v. Local 10, Plumbers,264 in

which plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged because he had refused to
rejoin the union. There was no formal union security agreement in force at
the time, and thus the discharge was clearly a violation of both the federal law
and the state right-to-work statute. The trial court held that the entire suit was
265
preempted. Correctly, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed.
Unfortunately, however, the court viewed the case as presenting a single preemption issue, while in fact there were two separate issues. Put differently, the
lack of a written union security agreement was relevant to preemption in two
distinct ways. First, the union had argued that under Schermerhorn II state
power begins only with the "actualnegotiation and execution of the type of
agreement describedby § 14(b) ,"266 and because there was no such agreement

in this case, the state courts lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. 267 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, held that for the purposes of coming within SchermerhornII, the allegation of an oral agreement was sufficient.
Indeed, one would think that even a tacit agreement would bring both the
union and the employer within the purview of a state right-to-work law, and
that no agreement is necessary when only the employer is being sued.
Second, however, it was the lack of a written agreement that, in part,
258. King v. Gemini Food Servs., Inc., 562 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1065 (1978).
259. 412 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D. Va. 1976).
260. Id at 1181.

261. Id
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402 (1952).
Id. at 154, 72 S.E.2d at 405.
211 Va. 520, 179 S.E.2d 15 (1971).
Id. at 524, 179 S.E.2d at 18.
375 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in original).
211 Va. at 522, 179 S.E.2d at 17.
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made the discharge also a violation of federal law. Viewed from that perspective, the case thus raises a larger issue not even touched upon by Schermerhorn
If-whether an agreement or a discharge that violates federal law for
whatever reason can also be proscribed under a state right-to-work law. The
argument has been made that section 14(b) merely authorizes the states to
prohibit what is not otherwise illegal under federal law, and if the federal law
prohibits it, then state remedies are foreclosed. 268 The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals did not focus specifically on that aspect of the preemption
argument. In fact, it seemed oblivious to it, which perhaps explains its rather
loose statement about the scope of state authority. The court said that "the
intent of § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act is to permit state regulation of unionsecurity agreements which otherwise would be allowed under § 8(a)(3) of the
Act." 26 9 If that is as far as state regulation can go, however, an agreement,
such as one calling for a closed shop, might meet the unrelated "agreement"
test of Schermerhorn 11270 but still be considered preempted because of its
illegality under federal law, as in this case. Even though the SchermerhornII
"agreement" test was met here, the section 8(a)(3) "agreement" requirement
clearly was not met, thus making the discharge arguably illegal under federal
law, with state law thus being preempted! In short, the court's actual holding
is inconsistent with some of the language used in reaching it.
The better view, of course, is that state right-to-work laws can independently prohibit all forms of compulsory unionism, regardless of federal prohibition.2 71 If the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had adopted this view, it
would not have been caught in the self-contradiction implicit in the decision.
III.

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps a testament to the clarity of the right-to-work statutes that
they have occasioned as little litigation as they have. These statutes apparently have communicated to employers, unions, and employees exactly what is
proscribed, thus obviating the need for much judicial clarification. On the
other hand, much of the litigation that has ensued could probably have been
avoided if the statutes had been more felicitously drafted. Adding to the confusion are right-to-work prohibitions clearly preempted by federal law. There
are, therefore, many models from which to choose-some good and some bad.
Assuming, however, that a state wants to enact a right-to-work statute
proscribing union security arrangements to the fullest extent allowed by federal law, while allowing for some ebb and flow in the preemption doctrine, the
following statute is recommended:
Section 1: It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of
that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or
268. Walles v. IBEW, 252 N.W.2d 701, 708-10 (Iowa), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977).
269. 211 Va. at 524, 179 S.E.2d at 18.

270. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
271. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961); see
generally T. HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 148-50.
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abridged on account of nonmembership in or nonaffiliation with any
labor organization.
Section 2: As used herein the term "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
Section 3: It shall be unlawful for any employer to require, as a condition of employment, that any employee be, become, or remain a
member of any labor organization or pay to such labor organization
any dues, fees or any other charges.
Section 4: It shall be unlawful for any person or labor organization
to induce, cause, or encourage any employer to violate Section 3.
Section 5: It shall be unlawful for any employer and any other person or any labor organization to agree that said employer will require, as a condition of employment, that any employee be, become,
or remain a member of any labor organization or pay to such labor
organization any dues, fees, or any other charges; such agreements
shall be null, void, and unenforceable.
Section 6: It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, or labor organizations to participate in any arrangement, agreement, or practice
that directly or indirectly has the effect of requiring, as a condition of
employment, that any employee be, become, or remain a member of
any labor organization or pay to such labor organization any dues,
fees, or any other charges.
Section 7: Any person, persons, or labor organizations who commit
any act or acts declared unlawful by this Act shall be liable to any
person injured thereby for actual damages including all costs of suit
and reasonable attorney's fees and, in the discretion of the judge or
jury, punitive damages.
Section 8: Violations of this Act may be enjoined by any court having general equity jurisdiction.
Section 9: Any person, persons, or labor organization who violates
any provision of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon
conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be
and not more than
punished by a fine of not less than $_
or by imprisonment for not less than - and not more than
$_,
- days, or by both, in the discretion of the court.

